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The introduction 
 
   Peter Parker and Uncle Ben are on my mind.  The reason is that is that a month ago I 
was jumped by Craig Venter.  There were TV cameras around.  The live audience was an 
interesting, edgy mix, on the interface between "technology", meaning computer 
technology, and culture/ media/ journalism; I had just given a closely prepared talk on the 
history, promises, and perils of biology, 20 minutes from solar system formation to origin 
of life to photosynthesis to agriculture to Asilomar to now; and I had paid particular 
attention to the existing threat from remade and lightly engineered viruses, and the 
various technology-empowered approaches that could contribute to a defense against 
unpredictable viral and bacterial pathogens. The whole set of ways the defense strategy 
needs to shift.  
 
     For whatever reasons, Craig came prepared to take the talk as an attack on himself and 
his agendas.  As if review of human use of biology in historical context, and talk about 
real risks, somehow threatened his ability to mobilize resources toward his goals: 
removing nonessential genes from Mycoplasma genitalium, synthesizing hydrogen and 
methane, cruising around the world in boats, etc.  The word "fearmonger" came up, 
multiple times.  "Chicken Little" came up too, afterwards.  And one terrific sound bite, 
which is that more people were killed by lightning last year than by anthrax attacks 
during the past 50 (see below).   
 
    Of course, nobody likes being jumped, but being jumped happens, I think I held my 
own, and when it's up on YouTube under Creative Commons, I hope it at least makes 
decent television.  More to the point, Craig happens.  Complaining that the man can go 
off half-cocked, or that he can conflate attempts at analysis with personal attacks...isn't 
relevant.  Might as well complain that hurricanes are wet and full of wind.  Because Craig 
is a force of nature, and, what's more, he's one of those forces of nature who is usually a 
force for good.  It is very largely due to him that we had large-scale shotgun sequencing 
as soon as we did.  And it's very largely due to his efforts and those of the extraordinary 
people he attracted that the fly genome, and then the human genome, were delivered so 
fast; had Craig not acted, it might have taken years more.  Craig's sense of scientific 
celebrity and his adroit use of it bespeak a deep intuitive understanding of our culture. 
His current work to focus attention on the genomic analysis of microbial ecologies and 
energy production is igniting imaginations and no doubt helping recruit the next 
generation of genomic scientists and engineers all over the world.  So this isn't about 
Craig.  Still less about the anomie of the US scientific intelligentsia (misunderstood... yet 
again... shall we cry?).   
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     Rather, this is about asking people who identify as members of a synthetic biology 
community to take a few next steps toward coming of age.  
 
The facts on the ground 
 
     The first starting point is that certain kinds of biological engineering, including 
making pathogens drug resistant, and recovering live viruses from transfected 
recombinant DNA, are technically feasible and have been so for a very long time.  The 
recovery of poliovirus from cDNA was accomplished by Baltimore and coworkers in 
1982.  To restate that, a generation ago, a lab (albeit one of the best virology and 
recombinant DNA labs in the world at the time) made infectious virus from DNA.  If one 
needed a demonstration that one could remake viruses, this was it.  Nowadays, remaking 
viruses is a matter of making appropriate DNA constructions that encode the viral 
genome and that provide any other functions needed to get live virus out.  Polio is one of 
the simple ones.  To remake many other DNA and RNA viruses requires helper 
functions-- for example, protein hardware to make negative RNA strands into positive 
RNA strands, or to start viral transcription going.  So, to remake viruses, one transfects 
with DNA that is the viral genome or (for RNA viruses) directs the synthesis of the viral 
genome, together with DNA that directs the synthesis of the helper functions.  You don't 
need to provide the helper functions from DNA constructs, you can also co-transfect 
genome-encoding DNA into cells co-infected with a related "helper virus" that you have 
screwed up so that it cannot replicate.  Depending on the virus one is re-making, the ways 
one goes about getting live virus from DNA used to construct it range from really simple 
(mix 12 things, wait 24 hours) to relatively gnarly (some classes of viruses have not even 
been done yet, so would require new construction work and troubleshooting).  To 
calibrate "gnarly", I mean "would take one of the 5,000 most skilled research groups in 
the world a year at least a year to carry out".  For any given family of virus, I (or any of 
more than a thousand scientists) can be a great deal more specific about how one would 
perform any given construction job, and what technical hurdles might still exist and how 
one would overcome them.  But given that this page will be crawled by Google within a 
week after it goes up, this is as specific as I'm now going to get. 
 
     The second starting point is to imagine two circles in a Venn diagram.  One circle is 
the set of people who know how to perform various manipulations and pieces of 
construction work, who could for example make the DNA, or troubleshoot what was 
wrong in a co-transfection setup as above.  The second circle is the set of people who 
might be motivated to build and release a self-replicating organism that hurts people.  
The number of people in the first circle has been growing steadily, at a guess at around 
10% per year, for many decades.  At the moment, the number in the second circle is 
large, and is sensitive to international attitudes (I am guessing that it has grown 
significantly in the past 5 years).  If we are in luck, there might now be no people in the 
intersection of those two circles.  But even if we are lucky now, there is no reason to 
think we will be lucky in the future, because the number of people in the first circle will 
continue to grow.   
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    To run the calculation for the first circle, let's ask, if there are 20,000 undergraduates at 
UC Berkeley, how many possess the technical skills and access to labs to make a gram 
positive organism, anthrax, resistant to the first line fluoroquinilone antibiotic, 
ciprofloxin? Let's guess that one tenth of them do.  2,000 UC Berkeley undergraduates.  
Now, let's try to guess how many UC Berkeley undergraduates have the DNA 
manipulating skills needed to construct the plasmids and perform the transfections 
needed to follow recipes to recover animal viruses?  Surely more than 20?  Maybe 200?  
Now, given that techniques keep getting easier, and more people keep getting trained in 
their use, how many past and present UC Berkeley undergraduates will have those skills 
in 2016?  
 
How synthetic biology interacts impacts this existing strategic situation 
 
     Now, the group of people who call themselves synthetic biologists did not make this 
situation.  But up to now, the community of synthetic biologists has been poorly defined 
and has staked out boundaries, that, from outside, seem weird and artificial. To be 
provocative, I am going to call the community a self-made ghetto, with an arbitrary line 
drawn to wall off a group from a much greater community of related activities (I am 
imagining the sacred cord, the eruv, that the faithful can place at the perimeter of 
orthodox Jewish neighborhoods, thus enabling those within the cord to perform certain 
activities on the Sabbath).  Inside the ghetto, good work on fabrication, abstraction 
hierarchies and (in the US but not in Europe where it is considered to be chemical 
engineering) on microbe-powered chemical synthesis.  At the same time, the 
overwhelming majority of the real genetic engineering work of the world, such as 
engineering of crop plants, the applications of genetic engineering to scientific research, 
to pharmaceuticals, and to medicine, and most of the complex applications of 
recombinant DNA to microbial synthesis of organic chemicals, has been going on for 3 
decades, outside the boundaries and largely unaware of ghetto activities. 
 
     So I would like to stipulate some things.  I believe that most reasonable people can 
agree with Venter that the applications of synthetic biology within the current ghetto 
boundaries pose no significant risk.  Hold a gun to my head, and I say: "zero risk".  Zero, 
zip, nada, none.  To say this again, there is no reason anyone should fear a minimal 
Mycoplasma genome, or a bug that makes plastic, or methane, or artemisinin. Period.  
Full stop.   
 
     But I also submit that most reasonable people can fear drug resistant anthrax, or 
smallpox, or a revenant 1918 flu that carries a point mutation that makes it resistant to the 
first line antiviral, tamiflu.  
 
     I also submit that the increased attention, capital investment, and technical ingenuity 
now being deployed to further develop chemical synthesis of long pieces of double-
stranded DNA provides another path to making DNA constructions.  It joins other 
schemes, ligation in vitro and PCR and various methods perform homologous 
recombination in vivo, but, yes, it definitely adds yet another path. For that reason, the 
widening capability to synthesize long pieces of DNA directly, increases the incremental 
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risk for biological attack.  I can't quantify that incremental risk but suspect that it this is 
low.  
 
     I further submit that developing an additional class of DNA hackers via high school 
and undergraduate engineering routes (as opposed to the existing scientific or biomedical 
communities) also provides some increment of risk.  I can't quantify that risk, either, 
although I suspect it is not high, but it will become very much higher if we permit an 
outlaw hacker culture to come into being and are foolish enough to glamorize it.   
 
     Finally, I submit that the synthetic biology community has been extremely proactive 
in recognizing those incremental risks introduced by large-scale synthesis of double 
stranded DNA and attempting to address them.  The general approach has been to 
identify those activities specific to self-identified Synthetic Biology, then, to the extent 
possible, seek to zero them out. This ghetto will police itself, at least a little.  Call it a 
"Hippocratic" approach: within the eruv, the boundary defined by the consecrated string, 
we will address our risks, we will not add to the potential for harm.   
 
The issue  
 
    The trouble is, that if one doesn't understand or recognize the boundaries defined by 
the sacred string, things immediately start seeming a little, um, Talmudic.  Asking for 
help in screening long double stranded pieces of chemically synthesized DNA to see they 
don't encode pathogens?  Look at how responsible we ghetto members are!  The fact that 
this screen won't apply to shorter, single stranded synthetic DNA, the fact that ligation in 
vitro, PCR and serial recombination in yeast and E. coli all provide perfectly good 
alternative ways to make any DNA construction?  Not our problem!  We synthetic 
biologists only police our own ghetto -- and we reserve the right to move the string that 
defines the boundary whenever we like.  Even though nobody else even understands the 
string, or insofar as they do understand it, takes the string with any seriousness. 
 
   The reason the boundaries and self-policing can't work anymore is that the multiple and 
reasonable connotations of the term "synthetic biology" naturally mean that anybody not 
of the ghetto will immediately associate it with the entirety of recombinant DNA work in 
general.  And this is a time when discussions about recombinant DNA powered work are 
breaking surface again.  For all sorts of reasons, including the ones above (On November 
18th, Kofi Annan called for international discussion about the dangers arising from the 
ability to resynthesize viruses).  In the US, visibility is only likely to increase, because the 
country is in a runup to elections in 2008 that will probably drag both energy policy and 
climate change into political discourse.  In fact, it's not too far a stretch to imagine we 
might hear about hemicellulose and lignin, microbial fermentation of higher alcohols and 
hydrogen, during the 2008 US Presidential debates.  So, for biology, we may once again 
be coming into an "Asilomar moment".  If this is true, then people who know how to 
make DNA constructions, from the very top of the celebrity chain (ie, Craig), all the way 
down to the 11th grade student who has just finished a high school science fair project, 
are going to be asked for their opinions as to whether and how organisms created by 
recombinant DNA work should be regulated. 
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    And I guess this is the place to recall the postmodern mythology.  Long ago, there was 
a time when Peter Parker was a freshly minted (as opposed to veteran) adolescent 
superhero.  Parker's Uncle, Ben, told him that "with great powers come great 
responsibilities".  Soon after that helpful pronouncement, Ben was killed by a criminal.  
The same miscreant whom Parker, as Spiderman, who had been tearning money as a 
wrestler, had refused to help the police apprehend.  Because collaring perps wasn't 
Spiderman's job.   
 
The responsibilities 
 
     So I am urging members of the synthetic biology community to acknowledge three 
responsibilities. 
 
    Responsibility to not screw up the defense.  The argument that more people are killed 
by lightning than anthrax will get every bit of the respect it deserves.  But it isn't enough 
to let fatuousness collapse under its own weight.  Much of what needs doing requires 
complex and thoughtful action.  In particular, the "Maginot line problem", that an 
attacker will want to outflank fixed defenses, means that we will need to move to agile 
detection and response to pathogens we cannot now predict.  Development and 
deployment of the needed technical measures constitutes a set of hard problems that will 
take brains, money, and time to solve.  Synthetic biologists can help with these problems 
if they are willing to learn enough to contribute to their solution. The complementary 
need to invent and implement appropriate social controls, be those criminal penalties, 
stigmatization, or licensing regimes, constitutes a set of equally hard problems that again 
will require creative brainpower to address.  Synthetic biologists can at least help explain 
these issues to other stakeholders, and can help input into these schemes to make sure that 
they do more good than harm.  The US and Europe being as they are, it now seems 
unlikely that the world will get adequate defenses into place before an attack, but some of 
us feel duty to act as if that is possible and prepare the ground for the needed work.  
Evasion and denial are not our friends here.  People who claim that there is no risk while 
other people are working to envision 21st century public health systems... those people 
are just not helping Uncle Ben. 
 
    Responsibility to tell the truth.  I admit that "truth" here can be slippery, especially for 
those of us whose jobs involve helping bring the future into being through our dreams.  
But when synthetic biologists step outside their ghetto, the people on the outside tend to 
ask questions on topics other than the oscillators, switches, minimal bacterial genomes 
and synthesis of fine chemicals by fermentation that the synthetic biologists dream about.  
This is the place where it's easy to slip up. 
 
     For example, journalists ask: what's new? (and they will ask this, that question being 
such a large part of their jobs).  Now, suppose a journalist asks a synthetic biologist what 
distinguishes her field from previous genetic engineering, and our synthetic biologist 
replies that in the past genetic engineers did not create assemblies of multiple parts to 
carry out desired functions, whereas synthetic biologists do.  That statement is utterly 
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counterfactual, but your basic science or business journalist cannot be expected to vett it, 
and in fact it appeared in all over print media in 2005 and 2006. Which alienated 
numerous of scientists outside the community who would otherwise have been 
supporters. Better to make the case for standardized parts and attention to abstraction 
hierarchies than to speak falsehood with authority.   
 
    Responsibility to the truth can also take on other forms.  If Craig, in order to help 
advance the idea that building synthetic bacterial genomes is safe, says that more people 
were killed by lightning in the last year than by anthrax attack in the last 50, it's of course 
true, just as it is true for people killed by exploding hydrogen warheads.  But even though 
it's true, it's just not especially relevant.  Call that... a "designed to distract" kind of true, 
an "Exxon-Mobil" kind of true.  Now imagine that, to decouple fears of microbial 
fermentation from fears of biological attack, a synthetic biologist finds herself asserting 
that it's not easy to remake measles, or influenza with synthetic DNA.  Or simply that 
there is a legitimate scientific uncertainty around that point, so that the prudent next step 
is... further study.  Plead uncertainty, or assert that there is a controversy, where none 
exists, and there we are back at Exxon-Mobil again.  Unless perhaps some readers believe 
that governments, foundations, and corporations should be staging scientific meetings in 
2010 to address an alleged lack of consensus as to whether human generated CO2 
emissions are contributing to a rise in average planetary temperature?  
 
    Finally, responsibility to the truth can take the form of admitting ignorance.  This 
summer there were interviews in which self-identified synthetic biologists were asked, 
among other things, about "experiments of concern".  Now, "experiments of concern" is 
what one calls a "term of art". It was coined in the Fink report, where it refers to 7 highly 
specific classes of activities (for example, deliberately making a pathogen resistant to a 
therapeutic drug).  Reading the transcripts, it is hard to shake the impression that, in some 
of the interviews, neither the graduate student interviewers (public policy students) nor 
the young leaders being interviewed (often, engineers, and in any case not infectious 
disease researchers) had any idea that the term had a specific meaning, much less what it 
did mean.  Is it too much to ask that at least one of the parties in these conversations have 
admitted that they didn't know exactly what they were discussing? 
 
     Responsibility to articulate and help bring about positive consequences.  I suspect that 
most people who read this will share the belief that biological engineering, recombinant 
DNA work, and synthetic biology have a great deal to contribute to a better human 
future.  And that the current ghetto boundaries, the focus on devices, minimal bacterial 
genomes, microbial chemical synthesis, and ability to make long pieces of double 
stranded DNA, do not capture all the good that needs to be done.  But, although I am very 
sympathetic to the ideas that hacking and playfulness are good for their own sake, I'm 
pretty sure that, for hacking in biology the public is not going to buy into this without a 
positive vision.  So, I suspect that to give the field traction, it will be necessary 
articulating and working toward achievable positive goals. 
 
     I've already mentioned defense.  There is a lot to do here, and of course I'd like to see 
students of biological engineering make more contributions than they have to problems of 
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disease detection, diagnosis, prophylaxis, and treatment.  But defense isn't the half of it.  
There are tremendous human needs during this century, including but not limited to food, 
energy, health, housing, water, cleanup, and, for all we know, emergency fixation of 
carbon.  Why should the next election not feature a proposal to spend 50 million dollars 
by 2010 on open source standard parts, genes encoding enzymes relevant to anabolism 
(carbon fixation, alcohol synthesis, energy storage materials, plant derived materials and 
functions) and catabolism (chemical remediation, recycling)?  Couple this with strong 
technical defenses and social norms including condign punishment of pathogen-makers, 
and you have a bridge you might be able to sell. 
 
Protecting Uncle Ben 
 
     Precisely because it has attained a measure of prominence, synthetic biology has 
attained a measure of power.  At the very least, it has increased its power to influence 
people's thoughts and opinions, and so affect public debate.  At the same time, technical 
trends that predate synthetic biology but will inevitably be associated with it have 
brought about the risky current landscape.  The consequences are pretty clear.  On some 
day in the future, they are going to hit us.  Fill in your own "they"; remember that "they" 
in 2006 may not be the same "they" as in 2016; remember that "they" in 2006 could be 
"he" or "she" in 2016; and fill in your own "us".  On the day that they hit us, significant 
numbers of Uncle Bens are going to die.  Fill in your own "Uncle Bens" 
 
     With greater powers come greater responsibilities. 
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